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I. Interest rate swap contract – a contract according to which one party pays periodic 
amounts of a given currency based on a specified fixed rate and the other party pays 
periodic amounts of the same currency based on a specified floating rate that is reset 
periodically. 
 
II. Single country agreement – agreements that are entered into within the same 
jurisdiction.  
 
III. ISDA Master Agreement – a standard document published by the International 



















“Derivatives are used by more than 94% of the world’s largest companies”
1
, which means 
that “with €471 trillion in notional amount outstanding as of December 2008, the global 




Interest rate swap contracts are a financial derivatives instrument that can be defined as a 
“transaction in which one party pays periodic amounts of a given currency based on a 
specified fixed rate and the other party pays periodic amounts of the same currency based on 
a specified floating rate that is reset periodically”.
3
 In other words, a swap is an agreement 
between two parties to exchange sequences of cash flows for a period of time. 
 
The proliferation of interest rate swap contracts together with its complexity gave rise to 
several disputes before courts all over Europe. One of those disputes involved several known 
Portuguese public companies and the Portuguese branch of one of the biggest banking groups 
in the world, Santander. Furthermore, substantial amounts were at stake and the decision 
would have a considerable impact in the Portuguese GDP. The combination of these factors 
made the judgment that was taking place before the High Court of Justice, in the United 
Kingdom, a “hot topic” in Portugal. I got especially curious about this subject when I realized 
that, apart from the financial nature of the decision, relevant questions of international private 
law arose.  
 
Therefore, I decided to further explore this topic, using the decision in the Banco Santander 
Totta v. Portuguese public companies’ case
4
 (“The Banco Santander Totta decision”) as a 
starting point to then reflect on the legal obstacles these agreements may face. I was 
especially motivated when I understood that the core question raised in this judgment could 
                                                          
1 Deutsche Borse Group, The Global Derivatives Market A Blueprint for Market Safety and Integrity, p. 10 (available in 
http://deutsche-boerse.com/blob/2532344/ebd7dc9b7aeac3efdf0c273309093130/data/the-global-derivatives-market-
0909_en.pdf). 
2 Ibidem, p.4. 
3 R. Venkata Subramani, Accounting for Investments, Fixed Income Securities and Interest Rate Derivatives – A 
Practitioner’s guide, Vol. II, (Willey, 2011), p. 283. 
4 Banco Santander Totta S.A. and Companhia de Carris de Ferro de Lisboa S.A., Sociedade de Transportes Colectivos do 




come up in any case concerning single country interest rate swap contracts entered into under 
the ISDA Master Agreement
5
, which increases the relevance of this research topic. Moreover, 
when investigating the subject, I came across another challenge of international private law 
that sparked my interest, the possibility of recognition and enforcement of these decisions in 
Portugal. 
 
Hence, I will start by explaining what is the ISDA Master Agreement, the model under which 
the majority of the derivatives contracts are concluded. Among other characteristics that will 
be clarified further ahead, the ISDA Master Agreements allows the parties to choose both the 
competent court and the governing law. This option opens the door to the possibility of the 
parties choosing the most favorable law to their interests, also known as “forum shopping”.  
This practice and its relationship with the law of conflicts will be explored in chapter III.  
 
Once understood how the derivatives market works, we can then address the questions of 
international private law that arise. Firstly, we will explore one of the exceptions to party 
autonomy regulated by article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation. Single country interest rate 
swap contracts are entered into between parties of the same country and yet the governing law 
is a foreign law, usually English law. In light of article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention, when 
all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country 
other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not 
prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement. Thus, the question comes up: are the elements of a single 
country interest rate swap contract located in one country or are there enough elements to 
internationalize the agreement in order to avoid the application of article 3 (3)? 
 
Having provided an answer to this first question, we will then move to another moment in the 
timeline of a decision – its recognition and enforcement. Article 45 of the Brussels Regulation 
and its public policy exception may also constitute an obstacle to swap contracts in light of 
Portuguese law. We will briefly go through the relevant case-law and the literature’s position 
in order to understand, firstly, whether the Portuguese law is being violated and secondly, 
whether those provisions integrate public policy so as to trigger the public policy exception of 
article 45 of the Brussels Regulation.  
                                                          
5 This model of agreement will be explained in chapter II.  
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II. The ISDA Master Agreement 
Derivatives can be traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, meaning directly between 
two parties outside a regulated exchange or trading venue. The need to harmonize the terms 
and the conditions of the agreements entered into in such an informal and diversified market 
as it is the OTC led the International Swap and Derivatives Association to publish, in 1987, 
the ISDA Master Agreement.  
This instrument sets forth a framework agreement that governs all the terms of the trading 
relationship of a derivatives transaction, a common language all the participants of the OTC 
market speak. It is a bilateral agreement composed of the master agreement, the main 
document that is never altered except to introduce the name of the parties. The Master is 
divided in 14 clauses that are called sections. The core provisions of the agreement, in the 
2002 version, are the Event of Default and Termination Events (section 5), the Early 
Termination Section (section 6) and the Definitions’ section (Section 14). During the 
formation of a contract, these are the terms and conditions that require more negotiation and 
can be the cause of a deadlock or even a rupture. With ISDA, these negotiations become a lot 
simpler, as there is common ground and a standard starting point under which the parties can 
then negotiate.  
As was anticipated in the introduction of this thesis, one of the topics that will be addressed is 
the single country interest rate swap contracts entered into via the ISDA Master Agreement, 
namely the obstacles that may come up with the choice of governing law. Thus, it is important 
to have a visual representation of the clause that gives rise to the issues at hand. Let us 
examine Clause 13 of the ISDA Master Agreement: 
 
“13. Governing Law and Jurisdiction 
 
(a)  Governing Law. This Agreement will be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the law specified in the Schedule. 
 
(b)  Jurisdiction. With respect to any suit, action or proceedings relating to any 






i.  submits: 
 
1.  if this Agreement is expressed to be governed by English law, to 
(A) the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts if the 
Proceedings do not involve a Convention Court and (B) the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts if the Proceedings do involve a 
Convention Court; or 
 
2.  if this Agreement is expressed to be governed by the laws of the 
State of New York, to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of 
the State of New York and the United States District Court located in 
the Borough of Manhattan in New York City; 
 
ii.  waives any objection which it may have at any time to the laying of 
venue of any Proceedings brought in any such court, waives any claim that 
such Proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient forum and further 
waives the right to object, with respect to such Proceedings, that such court 
does not have any jurisdiction over such party; and 
 
iii.  agrees, to the extent permitted by applicable law, that the bringing of 
Proceedings in any one or more jurisdictions will not preclude the bringing of 




By reading section 13, we came to the conclusion that the ISDA Master Agreement promotes 
the choice of either the English law
6
 or the law of the State of New York as the governing law 
of the agreement. This conclusion is strengthened by the User’s Guide to the ISDA 2002 
Master Agreement
7
 that states that “Parties that wish to elect a governing law for the 2002 
Agreement other than the English law or the laws of the State of New York should carefully 
                                                          
6 Out of curiosity, due to Brexit, the International Swap and Derivatives Association is drafting an ISDA Master Agreement 
with governing law and jurisdiction clauses pointing to France or Ireland.  
7 Available in: http://amwellclear.co.uk/w/images/6/67/ISDA_2002_User_Guide.pdf.  
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consider such an election with their legal advisers.”
8
 It is ISDA’s recommendation that the 
parties choose the courts of the country whose law they defined as the governing law of the 
agreement
9
. Thus, the governing law and the jurisdiction clause should point in the same 
direction.  
 
This suggests that the International Swap and Derivatives Association promotes what is called 
“forum shopping”, a practice that can be defined as the choice of the most favourable law to 
the parties. In the derivatives’ world, it is clear that both the English law and the law of New 
York are those favoured by the parties to derivatives contracts, mostly because of the use of 
the ISDA Master Agreement in the majority of OTC transactions. We will address this 
practice in the next chapter and provide some justifications for the choice of law and 
jurisdictions made by the ISDA Master Agreement.  
 
Apart from the Master Agreement, there is also the schedule to the agreement that allows the 
parties to modify the standard terms of the master agreement, in order to customize it. It 
addresses topics such as Termination Provisions, Tax Representations, Agreement to Deliver 
Documents, Miscellaneous and Other Provisions. Through this annex the parties can either 
choose between various options present in the Master Agreement or add new provisions. For 
instance, it is in the Annex that the parties can choose whether the contract will be governed 
by the English law or by the law of New York. Lastly, a Credit Support Annex can also be 




The adoption of the ISDA Master Agreement in the majority of the transaction in the OTC 
markets brought about several benefits. Firstly, there is a standardised instrument that allows 
the parties to “speak the same language” while negotiating (the extensive role of definitions 
provided in the master agreement is a useful tool), keeping, however, the margin to customize 
the agreement to their needs through the annex. Secondly, it promotes cost effectiveness and 
efficiency. Even though the terms and conditions have to be negotiated, the basic terms are 
harmonized, which shortcuts the process. Thirdly, several risks of the OTC market are 
                                                          
8 User’s Guide to the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, p. 38. 
9 2018 ISDA Choice of Court and Governing Law Guide, p. 10 (available in https://www.isda.org/a/7YsEE/180130_ISDA-
Choice-of-court-and-governing-law-guide-prepublication-fina.._02262018.pdf) - “Parties should note that the model clauses 
have been drafted with English law and the laws of the State of New York in mind together with the use of the corresponding 
‘local’ courts in each case”. 
10 To know more about the ISDA Master Agreements: Paul. C. Harding Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements (1992 and 




mitigated by the use of the ISDA Master Agreement. When it comes to dispute resolution, the 
agreement provides certainty regarding the means available. Furthermore, it increases 
transparency in a market where real and updated information about the counterparty may be 
difficult to obtain. Lastly, it reduces counterparty risk (the risk of default) and increases 
liquidity.  
 
As a final clarification, while the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement offered two forms of Master 
Agreement - a Local-Currency/Single Jurisdiction where the parties are located in the same 
jurisdiction and use the same currency or a Multi-Currency/Cross-Border -, the 2002 Master 





III. Forum Shopping – what is it and why does it occur in swap contracts? 
Forum Shopping is a practice that can be described as “the attitude of a person involved in an 
international dispute who takes his case to the court of a particular country not because it is 
best placed to hear the dispute but only because, under its rules on conflict of laws, it would 
apply the law giving the most advantageous result for this person.”
12
 
The jurisdiction and the governing clauses of the ISDA Master Agreement are an example of 
this practice. The agreement allows the choice between the English law or the law of New 
York, which sets the conflict of laws system aside and illustrates a clear preference for these 
two jurisdictions.  
Before we get into the details of why the ISDA Master Agreement is designed this way, some 
remarks have to be made regarding the relation between forum shopping and the rules on 
conflict of laws. These considerations will only concern the European Union reality so let us 
disregard for a moment the possibility to choose the law of New York.  
The parties’ interest in an agreement to choose the law and jurisdiction that will govern their 
contract only exists due to the largely disparate legal systems of the Member-States. What 
seems to be an obvious statement is indeed for some authors the proof that the conflict of laws 
systems have failed to achieve their main goal – uniformity of result regardless of the location 
                                                          
11 User’s Guide to the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, p.1. 
12 GREEN PAPER on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a 






 Hence, there is only space for forum shopping due to the lack of harmonization 
of private law among Member States. Nevertheless, one could ask if the unification of private 
law is desirable. Whilst we will not delve deep into this subject on this occasion, it is arguable 
that one of the means to achieve the political integration in Europe would be through the 
unification of private law, reducing to a minimum the autonomy of the domestic legal systems 
and leaving no space for forum shopping. However, it is my belief that the “the advantages of 
legal pluralism outweigh the disadvantages.”
14
 The competition between the Member States 
to offer the best legal solution will create  a sort of legal lab where several solutions will be 
tried out, enhancing the search for the best way to deal with a certain legal problem. 
Secondly, the legal system of a country is built to cope with the specific problems of a social, 
economic and cultural reality. Unification of private law would make the rules less suited to 
the domestic challenges. Lastly, one should not forget that different levels of harmonization 
could be applied to different areas of private law. Thus, “there are undoubtedly clearly 
defined areas where unification is essential, such as customs law and certain areas of 
economic law, the law on aliens […], company law and consumer contract law.”
15
  
With unification being difficult and undesirable to achieve, forum shopping will continue to 
occur. Indeed, it is an expression of the principle of freedom of choice, the cornerstone of 
private international law. Parties’ self determination should be respected as far as values such 
as certainty and predictability are at stake.  
Nevertheless, the lack of limits to this practice would unquestionably undermine the role of 
the law of conflicts. Private international law as a legal discipline exists to decide which 
jurisdiction has competence over an international situation by choosing the most relevant 
connection with it. If we allow the parties to replace “the result of centuries of evolution and 
careful balance of the interests at stake”
16
 that culminated in a solid system of law of 
conflicts with their own will in every case and situation, the value of justice would be 
endangered.  
Consequently, limits to forum shopping and to party autonomy are required. The principle of 
freedom of choice only operates in relationships where the parties are given the faculty to 
choose the governing law (e.g. contractual obligations). And even here, limits are defined and 
                                                          
13 C. Granger, The Conflict of Laws and Forum Shopping: some recente decisions on jurisdiction and free enterprise in 
litigation, Vol. 6:416 (Ottawa Law Review, 1974), p. 471, available in https://commonlaw.uottawa.ca/ottawa-law-
review/sites/commonlaw.uottawa.ca.ottawa-law-review/files/25_6ottawalrev4161973-1974.pdf. 
14 Luís de Lima Pinheiro, Estudos de Direito Internacional Privado Vol. II (Almedina, 2009), p. 167. 
15 Idem, p.166. 
16 Idem, p. 184.  
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article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention, the core provision of the next chapter, is an example 
of this. Parties cannot use forum shopping to escape the mandatory rules of the legal system 
they have the best connection with. Otherwise, forum shopping would be the perfect way to 
practice fraud.  
Having provided these clarifications on forum shopping and on their relationship with the law 
of conflicts, it is time to answer the question of why the ISDA Master Agreement has chosen 
the English Law or the law of the state of New York.  
The answer comes down to the role of the UK and the US in financial markets. London and 
New York are the world’s financial capitals and the English language is the official language 
of the financial industry and of derivatives markets. Moreover, or as a consequence of it, their 
judges have more expertise and knowledge on the subject, what in theory allows them to 
render technical decisions more skillfully and in less time. Additionally, the assignment of the 
contractual position is a common practice in the derivatives contracts and the need for 
legitimate expectations as to the court that will settle the disputes is the ground for those 
assignments. Lastly, there is a clear preference for the common law system, could be justified 
by the central role of the judge and of precedent. 
 
IV. Is the Rome I Regulation an obstacle to single country interest rate swap 
contracts? 
 
a. The Rome I Regulation 
The Rome I Regulation applies to contractual obligations on civil and commercial matters 
(article 1 [1]). Thus, since interest-rate swap contracts do not fit into any of the exceptions 
featuring in article 2 (2), they are covered by the Regulation.  
Article 1 also states that the Rome I Regulation applies to situations involving a conflict of 
laws. The core discussion of this thesis being a situation that could be defined as a purely 
domestic situation - since all the elements are connected with a single country, despite the 
parties having chosen a foreign law -, it is inevitable to ask whether there is a real conflict of 
laws. In other words, is the Rome I Regulation applicable to the situation at hand? Authors do 
not have a uniform answer to this question, even though there is a clear trend. The large 
majority supports the idea that the Regulation applies to contracts that do not have an 
12 
 
international nature, being the choice of a foreign law to govern the contract by parties of the 
same country a sufficient element to place the agreement within the scope of the Regulation
17
. 
Others state that the purpose of article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation is not to address a 
situation where there is not a real conflict of laws
18
. The assumption followed on this thesis, 
along with the majority of the authors, is that the choice of a foreign law is sufficient to create 
a conflict of laws, with the Banco Santander Totta decision being a good example of this.   
As it was explained before, the ISDA Master Agreement allows for the choice of the 
applicable law to the contract. This possibility is in accordance with what is the cornerstone of 
European Private International Law in matters of contractual obligations: party autonomy, 
with the Rome I Regulation (article 3 (1)) being the perfect example. The principle of 
freedom of choice establishes that “the parties are free to determine the law applicable to 
their contract by agreement”
19
. Hence, as long as there is no dispute as to its validity, the 
choice is absolutely free. No connection with the parties or the contract in necessary to choose 
the applicable law to the contract
20
 or, as common law refers to, the proper law of the 
contract.
  
However, exceptions to party autonomy are made throughout the Regulation, namely on 
articles 5 (2) and on article 7, where party autonomy is limited when choosing the applicable 
law to the contract: in carriage contracts, the choice is limited to five jurisdictions, the same 
being applicable to small insured risks.  
Moreover, it was the European legislator’s intention to limit the aforementioned forum 
shopping, where the parties to a contract try to circumvent the application of mandatory 
provisions of the legal system they have the closest connection with by choosing another legal 
order as the governing law. This is the rationale behind article 3 (3), the key provision of this 
                                                          
17 Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, p.10 
(available in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31980Y1031(01)&from=EN);  
Franco Ferrari and Stefane Leible, Rome I Regulation – The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (Sellier. 
European Law publishers, 2009), p. 2: “European conflict of laws even provides the choice for contracts which are, except 
for a choice in favour of another law, exclusively connected to one and the same country”;  
Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2016, 3º ed.), p. 115: “The 
Regulation applies in principle even to contracts that do not have international character, i.e., those contracts where all 
elements are connected with one single country only, regardless of whether this is a foreign country or the country of the 
forum.” 
18 Luís de Lima Pinheiro, p. 417.  
19 Franco Ferrari and Stefane Leible, Rome I Regulation – The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, p. 2. 





chapter that will be explored further ahead. A final remark to article 9 of the Regulation 
(Overriding mandatory provisions), which constitutes itself a limitation to party autonomy. 
Party autonomy is one of the principles the Rome I Regulation upholds, together with a high 
degree of predictability and “room for manoeuver for the forum to correct the default choice 
in favour of the country the contract is most closely connected”
21
. 
The topic of this thesis arises precisely from the balance between party autonomy and the 
need to apply the mandatory provisions of the legal order the contract is closest connected 
with.  
At this stage, it is important to recall article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation in order to 
correctly frame the problem. Thus, “where all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, 
the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that 
other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement.” 
As was mentioned before, the Banco Santander case decided before the English High Court of 
Justice will be the focus of this chapter’s discussion since it brings the much-needed legal 
certainty to the governing law clauses in single country interest rate swaps, a grey domain by 
the time this decision was handed over.  
 
b. Previous case law 
Even though we will be relying on the Banco Santander decision as the correct framework on 
how to address the topic of this thesis, it is important to walk through the previous case law to 
understand how the High Court of Justice reached the interpretation provided in the decision. 
Both the England High Court of Justice (first instance) and the Court of Appeal were called to 
decide on the application of the Rome I Convention (the predecessor of the Rome I 
Regulation) to single country interest rate swap transactions a few times. During this chapter, 
I will refer to both the Rome I Convention and the Rome I Regulation, depending on which 
one was in force at the time the swap contracts were entered into. Nevertheless, despite the 




slight differences in the wording of the provision, “changes […] are mostly not intended to 
bring about a change of content”.
22
 
Haugesund Kommune v DEPFA ACS Bank
23
, opposed, before the Court of Appeal in 2010, 
an Irish bank and local municipalities in Norway. In 2014, a case was brought before the High 
Court of Justice between a bank and a Dutch social housing association
24
. In common, they 
had interest rate swap contracts entered into between the parties and a choice of law clause 
determining the English law as the law governing the contractual provisions. Furthermore, 
one of the questions raised in both cases was similar: did the local municipalities or the social 
housing association have capacity to enter into these contracts? The Rome I Convention, 
applicable at the time the contracts were concluded, determines that the issue of capacity is 
outside its scope of application (article 1/2/f)). Therefore, even though the consequences of 
the lack of capacity were determined by English law, the legal capacity itself was governed by 
Norwegian and Dutch law. 
 
However, it was the dispute between Dexia Crediop SPA and Comune Di Prato
25
 (“Dexia”) 
that raised the question of the applicability of 3(3) of the Rome I Convention to single country 
interest rate swap contracts concluded under the ISDA Master Agreement whose choice of 
law clause defined the English law as the governing law. Note that the legal capacity issue 
was overcome in this decision since under Italian Law, Prato had legal capacity to enter into 
these contracts.  
The case concerned an Italian investment bank and an Italian local authority responsible for 
the municipality of Prato. The former was appointed to help restructure Prato’s debt and, as 
part of the plan, several interest rate swap contracts were entered into. They followed the 
ISDA Master agreement and English law was defined as the applicable law to the agreements. 
When the dispute arose, one of Prato’s arguments was that the enforcement of its obligations 
under the agreements meant the violation of mandatory provisions of Italian law. Therefore, 
article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention should be relied upon to determine the application of 
the mandatory provisions of Italian law that could not be derogated by contract. 
Judges were called to decide whether this was a purely domestic agreement or whether there 
were elements relevant to the situation that were not located in Italy. The parties were both 
                                                          
22 Franco Ferrari and Stefane Leible, Rome I Regulation – The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, p. 1. 
23 Haugesund Kommune & anor v Depfa ACS Bank & anor [2010] EWCA Civ 579. 
24 Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm). 
25 Dexia Crediop SPA v Comune Di Prato [2015] EWCA 1746 (Comm). 
15 
 
incorporated in Italy, the agreement was entered into in Italy and the obligations were to be 
performed in Italy. Could it be categorized as a domestic situation or was the use of the ISDA 
Master Agreement enough to internationalize it and block the application of article 3 (3) of 
the Rome I Convention?  “As to the master agreement, it is true that it is an international 
standard form, but it does not follow from this that it is an ‘element in the situation’ which is 
connected to a country other than Italy. It is of course designed to promote certainty, but that 
does not give it a connection to a country other than Italy. Nor does the significance and 
global nature of ISDA. […] Throughout the relevant period everything relevant to the use of 
the form happened in Italy.”
26
 In that regard, the judges stated that Prato could rely upon the 
mandatory provisions of Italian financial law that were being violated by the agreements (e.g. 
the requirement to inform Prato of its entitlement to a 7day cooling-off period). Hence, the 
use of the ISDA Master Agreement was not enough to render “international” what was 
defined as a domestic situation and mandatory provisions of Italian law were able to limit the 
choice of law clause. English law would still be applicable in all matters not related to the 
mandatory provisions.  
This judgement is an example of how the cornerstone of the Rome I Regulation – party 
autonomy – had to be balanced with the values of the legal systems parties are operating in. 
The rationale behind article 3 (3) is precisely preventing parties from escaping the internally 
mandatory provisions of their country, preserving the proper law principle according to which 
a situation should be governed by the legal order which has the closest connection with it
27
. 
Hence, a purely domestic case should be governed by the laws of that country as far as 
mandatory provisions are concerned, with the choice of law clause being valid in all other 
matters.   
It is important to stress that this decision was based on an interpretation of article 3 (3) of the 
Rome I Convention according to which “elements relevant to the situation” means elements 
connecting the situation to a particular country
28
. Thus, in light of it, it would be necessary 
that the elements relevant to the situation pointed to a specific country other than Italy to 
place the agreement outside the scope of article 3 (3). We will see over this thesis how this 
interpretation has evolved and how it was key to reach the point where we stand today.  
                                                          
26 Idem, paragraph 211. 
27 GREEN PAPER on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a 
Community instrument and its modernisation, presented by the Commission, p.10. 




c. The Banco Santander Totta decision 
The Banco Santander Totta decision was much expected all over Europe since it would 
determine the future of single country interest rate swap contracts concluded under the ISDA 
Master Agreement. Would it be possible for the High Court of Justice to uphold the 
conclusions reached in Dexia and support that the choice of law clause in interest rate swap 
contracts entered into under the ISDA Master Agreement by single country parties does not 
affect the application of mandatory provisions of that country’s legal system? What would be 
considered mandatory provisions in a certain legal order? How would the derivatives market 
react to this scenario of legal uncertainty that would invariably strike millions of interest rate 
swap contracts? This is precisely the point of view of Adrian Briggs who, despite sustaining 
that article 3 (3) should be triggered in a domestic situation, acknowledges the danger of such 
broad interpretation in commercial litigation due to the uncertainty it can bring
29
.   
Bearing these questions in mind, the High Court of Justice had the chance to reflect again on 
whether article 3(3) of the Rome I Convention could be seen as an obstacle to single country 
swap contracts concluded under the ISDA Master Agreement with a governing law clause. 
The claimant was a Portuguese bank, affiliate of the Santander group, a Spanish banking 
giant. The defendants were all public sector Portuguese transport companies operating in 
Lisbon and Oporto. The dispute arose due to nine interest swap contracts under the ISDA 
Master Agreement entered into by the parties between 6 June 2005 and 2 November 2007.  
Even though it is not my intention to explore the financial characteristics of this instrument, it 
is important to stress that the interest-rate swaps in question were what is called exotic swaps 
with a snowball effect, as opposed to vanilla swaps. The latter “is an interest-rate swap 
exchanging a fixed leg whose payment depend on a fixed rate for a floating leg whose 
payment depend on a floating rate in which the notional principle remains constant over the 
life of the contract and where the maturity of the floating-rate index is identical to the 
payment frequency of the floating-leg flows
30
”. Nonetheless, what makes the swaps at stake 
unusual and exotic is “[…] the incorporation of a “memory” feature. […], once the reference 
interest rates (EURIBOR and sometimes LIBOR) moved outside upper or lower “barriers”, 
                                                          
29 Adrien Briggs, Private Internation Law in English Courts, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 7.117. 
30 Lionel Martellini, Philippe Priaulet and Stépanhe Priaultet, Fixed-Income Securities, Valutation, Risk Management and 
Portfolio Strategies (Willey, 2003), p. 324.  
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the fixed rate payable by the Transport Companies [being the bank the floating rate payer and 
the public companies the fixed rate payer] had a “spread” added to it. The spread was 
cumulative at each payment date, and was subject to leverage […], hence the swaps being 
described as “snowball” swaps
31
”.  
Furthermore, the long-term nature of these instruments also contributed for its classification 
as risky derivatives. As a matter of fact, it was the first time the court was called up to decide 
on a case concerning swap contracts with these features that end up maximizing the 
consequences of interest rates being close to zero. This was precisely what happened after the 
financial crisis of 2009, causing massive losses for public companies. Hence, in 2013 they 
stopped making payments to Santander, with the total unpaid amount in 1 October 2015 
adding up to EUR 272,561,157.  
While Santander Totta claimed that public companies’ obligations under these agreements 
were valid and therefore enforceable, the defendants argued that these agreements violated 
mandatory rules of Portuguese law, such as the abnormality in the change of circumstances or 
the prohibition of “games of chance”. That would justify the inapplication of the choice of 
English law grounded on article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation (because all the elements 
relevant to the situation were connected with Portugal) in what concerns the Portuguese 
mandatory provisions.  
The public companies grounded their defence, in light of Dexia’s line of reasoning, on the 
assumption that there is no element in the agreements that links them to the legal order of any 
other country apart from Portugal. Thus, mandatory provisions of Portuguese law that cannot 
be derogated by contract should apply.  
Conversely, Santander Totta followed the interpretation of article 3 (3) according to which it 
is sufficient to identify international elements in the agreements that point away from Portugal 
to place the agreements outside the scope of the article.  
The High Court of Justice adopted Banco Santander Totta’s line of reasoning, structuring the 
entire decision based on the discussion of the international character of the agreements. It 
stated that “For the purpose of Article 3 (3) of the Rome Convention, in determining whether 
all the other elements relevant to the situation are connected with one country only, the 
                                                          




enquiry is not limited to elements that are local to another country, but includes elements that 
point directly from a purely domestic to an international situation”. 
32
 
Firstly, the court reflected on the fact that, according to the agreements, Santander Totta could 
assign its position in the contracts to any subsidiary of Banco Santander Central Hispano S.A. 
Therefore, the possibility of a non-Portuguese party replacing Santander Totta in the 
agreements was contemplated since their signatures, which illustrates that the scenario of an 
international contract was not set aside by public companies.  
The claimant used this element relevant to the situation to differ from Dexia’s precedent since 
in the latter there was no provision contemplating the substitution of any of the parties for a 
non-Italian entity. The defendants sustained that even though this possibility was 
contemplated in the agreements, at the time of the conclusion of the contracts no assignment 
of the contractual position had taken place. Hence, the parties to the contracts remained 
Portuguese during the period they were in place.  
The court had to categorize the right to assign the contractual position either as a potential 
element relevant to the situation or as an actual element relevant to the situation. The question 
that had to be made was whether Santander Totta would have entered into the agreements if 
this right was not contemplated. Even though the decision does not elaborate on it, it was the 
court’s conclusion that this was a relevant provision in the agreements. Firstly, due to the 
dimension of the Santander Group, with several subsidiaries all over the world, which could 
justify, in order to achieve group’s goals, the assignment of the contractual position. 
Secondly, due to the nature of the contract that creates potential obligations to the bank over 
the long term. Hence, “the significance of the bank’s right of assignment in the present 
contract is that the parties envisaged that performance over the substantial period (averaging 
14 or so years) that the swaps covered could be by a non-Portuguese bank”
33
. The 
perspective offered by the court is incompatible with the public companies’ view of the 
situation as a purely domestic one. 
The first conclusion reached by the courts places the situation under analysis outside the 
scope of article 3 (3) but, most importantly, provides the parties to these contracts with a 
concrete criterion they can rely on. An assignment provision in an agreement where one of the 
parties is a cross-border corporate group internationalizes the situation.  
                                                          
32 The Banco Santander Totta decision, paragraph 404. 
33 The Banco Santander Totta decision, paragraph 409. 
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Secondly, the court considered the address given by Santander Totta under the interest rate 
swap contracts, namely the fact that it was a British address. However, the court quickly 
dismissed this argument, stating that it was irrelevant.  
The third element relevant to the situation that was addressed by the court was the use of the 
“Multicurrency-Cross Border” form (1992 ISDA Master Agreement). In previous 
transactions, the parties had used a Portuguese framework to enter into swaps agreements. 
However, by the time the disputed contracts were concluded, they had already switched to 
ISDA documentation.   
At this stage, it is important to recall what the purpose of the Multicurrency-Cross Border 
form is in order to fully understand the meaning of its use. It is a form designed for 
international transactions, with the parties involved hailing from different jurisdictions. 
Despite the fact that the 2002 version of the ISDA Master Agreements is exclusively intended 
to be used as a multicurrency agreement, the 1992 version, the one used by the parties in these 
contracts, comprised both a cross-border version and a single jurisdiction form
34
. Therefore, 
having the chance to choose between the two types of agreements, it was the parties’ will to 
use a multicurrency agreement. 
Furthermore, the use of English as the language to define the terms of the agreements must 
also be taken into consideration. Even though it is the language commonly used in commerce, 
especially in what concerns banking and finance, the parties are both Portuguese and the 
agreements must have been negotiated in Portuguese so the question remains – is the use of 
English a relevant element to the situation?  
Both the use of the Multicurrency-Cross Border form and the use of the English language led 
the court to decide on the question whether the documentation itself should be considered an 
element relevant to internationalize the situation. It is the court’s view that “there are 
practical reasons for taking account of the documentation as an element in its own right”
35
.  
Indeed, this has been the position adopted by Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice
36
 when it 
was called upon to decide on the validity of the choice of court clause in a swap entered into 
under the ISDA Master agreement. Even though the question of the competent court 
addressed by Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels Regulation) differs from the one we are 
                                                          
34 User’s Guide to the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2003 Edition). 
35 The Banco Santander Totta decision, paragraph 400. 
36 Ac. STJ 21.4.2016, Process nº 538/14.2TVLSB.L1.S1 (António Silva Gonçalves).  
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discussing here, the rationale behind both questions is similar: is an international element in 
the relationship between the parties needed to block the application of article 3(3) of the 
Rome I Convention, the same way article 25 of the Brussels Regulation
37
 requires an 
international element to avoid the general rule according to which people should be judged in 
the court of their domicile due to their closest connection with it? Both provisions reflect a 
deviation from the proper law principle based on freedom of choice. However, they both need 
an international element that justifies it, otherwise the closest connection (the country where 
all the relevant elements to the situation are located or the domicile of the defendant) will 
prevail.  
Returning to the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice’s decision regarding the validity of 
choice of court clauses in a single country swap under the ISDA Master Agreement, it has 
been its position that the swap contracts have an inherent international nature due to, among 
other reasons, the use of the ISDA. Hence, the validity of the clause granting jurisdiction to 
English courts should be assessed in light of article 25 of the Brussels Regulation, being 
absolutely valid. Thus, Portuguese courts should refuse to accept jurisdiction over this 
question, with the English courts remaining as the competent ones.   
The importance given by the High Court of Justice to the ISDA Documentation in the Banco 
Santader Totta decision, classifying it as an element relevant to the situation that is not 
connected with Portugal, is, in my view, the right way to address the question and confirms 
the harmonized opinion of Portuguese courts in what can be called a “parallel question”. A 
Portuguese court will never be called upon to decide a question concerning the choice of 
English law in a swap between Portuguese parties since the case will be brought before the 
competent court (the English Court). Conversely, when it is the jurisdiction of the court that is 
being disputed, the case will be brought before the Portuguese courts, claiming the invalidity 
of the choice of court clause. These are “mirror questions” which have the same legal 
grounding and a different answer to each of them would jeopardize the legal certainty that this 
topic requires.  
Returning to the Banco Santander Totta decision, the fifth element the court had to reflect on 
was the involvement of both Banco Santander Negócios Portugal S.A. (BSNP), another 
subsidiary of Santander Spain in Portugal and Santander Spain itself in the agreements.  
                                                          
37 In light with ECJ’s position, namely Owusu (process C- 281/02, paragraphs 25 and 26), Lindner (process C- 327/10 
paragraphs 29 and 30) and Maletic (process C-478/12 paragraph 26).  
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Since these contracts involved a huge risk exposure, Santander Totta adopted what is called 
the “back-to-back swap” strategy. Hence, to hedge its exposure, Santander Totta entered into 
reverse swap contracts with BSNP under the ISDA Master Agreement, cancelling the risk of 
the swaps concluded with the Portuguese companies, as each swap in a back-to-back structure 
cancels the other one out. The same was done by BSNP by concluding back-to-back swaps 
with Santander Spain, building a chain with the purposes of hedging risk for Santander Totta, 
passing it on to Santander Spain via BSNP. 
As the string described in the previous paragraph clearly reveals, the involvement of 
Santander Spain in these transactions is crucial.  Firstly, because Santander Totta was 
dependent on Santander Spain to conclude the swaps, seeing as without the back-to-back 
swaps, it would not have the structure to bear the risks involved and would not have entered 
into the agreements with the Portuguese companies in the first place. Secondly, since it would 
be Santander Spain ultimately bearing the risk of the swaps, it had a central role in defining 
their terms. Therefore, “BST did not have the capabilities to sell complex derivatives on its 
own. It was dependent on Santander to price such derivatives, to calculate the credit risk 
exposure of the transactions and to hedge BST’s market risk through back-to-back swaps”
38
.  
Despite the attempt of Portuguese Public Companies to argue that the back-to-back swaps 
were entered into with a Portuguese bank (BSNP) and that they were not aware of the chain 
that came after, the High Court of Justice considered the involvement of Santander Spain a 
relevant element that points way from Portugal.  
Another element that was taken into consideration in the court’s decision was the fact that 
swaps were entered into in an over-the-counter (OTC) market. OTC markets are decentralized 
markets, without a physical location where participants use several communication methods 
to trade with their counterparty, from telephone to instant messaging. Hence, “[…] BST swaps 
were anchored in a market that is necessarily international in its operations”
39
, with this 
being a relevant element to the situation that is not connected with Portugal. Proof of this 
argument is the number of swaps the defendants entered into with banks all over the world 
(USA, Switzerland, UK, Germany, France, Spain and Japan).  
                                                          
38 The Banco Santander Totta decision paragraph 409, (5), (ii). 
39 Idem 409, (6), (ii). 
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Lastly, the High Court of Justice addressed the use of international benchmark rates, namely 
EURIBOR and LIBOR, in the contracts. Nevertheless, it considered this element irrelevant to 
the situation as even domestic transactions rely on these rates. 
In summary, the court was called up to decide which interpretation of article 3 (3) of the 
Rome I Convention should be adopted in single country agreements. On the one hand, 
following Dexia, if there is no relevant element that connects the contract with a specific 
country apart from the one they were entered into in, article 3 (3) must be triggered and 
mandatory provisions of that legal order must be applied. On the other hand, there is Banco 
Santander Totta’s line of reasoning according to which it is enough to avoid article 3 (3) to 
have elements that internationalize the agreement, even though they do not connect it with a 
specific country. In short, the relevant question was whether they were purely domestic 
contracts or not.  
As was already anticipated in this thesis, the court’s decision was that “[…] Art. 3 (3) of the 
Rome Convention was not engaged because all elements relevant to the situation at the time 
of the choice were not connected with Portugal only.”
40 
This decision overturned the previous case law of the High Court of Justice and gave a clear 
interpretation of how article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation should be applied when single 
country interest rate swap contracts are at stake.  
The legal certainty regarding the governing law of the agreement, much needed in the 
derivatives market, was finally brought about by this judgement, closing a door of doubts that 
was affecting the market. Broadening the interpretation of article 3 (3) the way the court did 
in Dexia in order to fit a larger number of situations was a much too simplistic approach to the 
problem and to the derivatives market in the 21st century.  
It is important to recall the text of the article so we can fully understand the interpretation 
given by the court. Therefore, “where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the 
choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other 
country which cannot be derogated from by agreement”. The court’s understanding in Dexia 
was that, apart from the choice of law clause of the ISDA Master Agreement, there was no 
                                                          




other element that connected the contracts with another legal order aside from Italy. 
Conversely, in the Banco Santander Totta decision, the court stated that in order to escape the 
scope of application of article 3 (3), the elements did not have to connect the agreements with 
another country apart from Portugal but merely to internationalize it.  
This interpretation is in accordance with the derivatives market itself.  When an interest rate 
swap contract is entered into, it is impossible to anticipate the jurisdictions it will be 
connected with since it is constantly being traded in markets with participants all over the 
world. Thus, requiring a connection with a specific country is too demanding for such a 
volatile product. Moreover, this decision clearly stresses that the purpose of article 3 of the 
Rome I Regulation is to protect party autonomy and any limitation to it must be as narrow as 
possible. Indeed, a scenario where the validity of derivatives contracts is constantly being 
questioned would destroy the market.  
 
d. The confirmation of the right path 
The approach followed by the High Court of Justice in Banco Santander Totta decision was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Dexia
41
, overturning the decision of the High Court of 
Justice in the latter case. 
In this judgement, the Court of Appeal assessed several elements, namely the use of the 
Multi-Currency Cross Boarder form of the ISDA Master Agreement, the fact that the 
agreements were signed in English and the back-to-back arrangements entered into by Dexia 
Crediop to hedge its exposure.  
It was the court’s conclusion that these factors are “enough on its own to demonstrate an 
international and relevant element in the situation such that it is impossible to say that all 
elements (other than the choice of law) relevant to the situation are located in a country other 
than England such as (in this case) Italy. The international dimension precludes any such 
assertion.”
42
 Hence, “once an international element comes into the picture, Article 3(3) with 
its reference to mandatory rules should have no application.”
43 
                                                          
41 Dexia Crediop SPA v Comune Di Prato [2017] EWHC Civ. 
42 Idem, paragraph 134. 
43 Idem, paragraph 137. 
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These two cases set a precedent regarding the interpretation of article 3 (3) of the Rome I 
Regulation that is reliable and will remain in place due to its appropriateness to the 
transnational nature of the derivatives market.   
 
V. The ‘Ordre Public’ and the Recognition of the Award (the Brussels I Regulation) 
 
a. The Brussels I Regulation 
In the previous chapter, the obstacles a single country interest rate swap contract may face 
regarding the validity of the choice of law clause were dealt with. Alongside the choice of the 
governing law of the agreement comes the choice of the competent court. As discussed in 
chapter III (Forum Shopping), parties that use the ISDA Master Agreement tend to choose not 
only English law as the governing law but also English courts as the competent ones. Doing 
otherwise would create situations where a Portuguese court would be applying English law or 
an English court would be issuing a ruling according to Portuguese law, which is not 
advisable according to ISDA.  
The choice of court (jurisdiction) is regulated by Article 25 of the Regulation nº 1215/2012 
(the Brussels I Regulation) and is based, the same way article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention 
is, in party autonomy. Even though the grounds on which the validity of the choice of court 
clause can be challenged will not be addressed in this thesis, since the contracts under analysis 
do not raise any specific questions, the Brussels I Regulation will be the core of this chapter. 
In that regard, we will study the last moment of the timeline of a foreign decision, its 
recognition in the country of origin of the parties.  
The Brussels I Regulation provides for rules on jurisdiction and on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. Regarding jurisdiction, it 
establishes that the court with jurisdictions to settle the dispute is the court of the domicile of 
the defendant (article 4). There are exceptions to this rule, namely special and exclusive 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction on matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts and individual 
contracts of employment. As for the recognition and enforcement of the a decision, it 
determines a principle of free movement of judgements according to which “a judgement 





 There are exceptions and this chapter will focus on one of them 
– the public policy exception (‘ordre public’). 
In order to fully understand the obstacles a decision regarding interest rate swaps issued by an 
English court may face when recognized and enforced in Portugal, the wording and the scope 
of article 45 of the Brussels I Regulation has to be explained.  
In what concerns this thesis, article 45 states that: 
“On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused:  
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (‘ordre publi’) in the 
Member State addressed;” 
 
b. The public policy exception 
The public policy exception is present in several regulations of European Union law
45
 and yet 
it is rarely applied. This exception was created to protect the ultimate values of the lex fori 
that can be at risk due to the application of a foreign law. However, there is a “worldwide 
consensus that the public policy clause operates as an exception – the respective provisions of 
the European instruments   require   the   old   of   a   manifest contradiction   to   public   
policy”
46
. This can be understood in light of the main idea that is behind the creation of the 
European Union – to build “a legal system established to deal with a series of contemporary 
problems and realise a set of goals that individuals states felt unable to manage alone”
47
.  
A public policy exception being often used would jeopardize this purpose since it would 
isolate each country and each legal order, compromising the goal of mutual recognition 
among the member states and the free movement of judgements. Thus, even before we look at 
the case-law addressing the public policy exception, it is clear that the position adopted by the 
European Court of Justice can only be a narrow interpretation of this concept that defines 
explicitly the limits of its application. Otherwise, claimants would always rely on the public 
                                                          
44 Article 36 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
45 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000, Regulation (EC) No 
1206/2001, Regulation (EC) No 593/2008, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007. 
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policy exception as a ground to prevent the recognition and enforcement of a decision issued 
in other Member States, which would ultimately render the Brussels I Regulation useless.  
With this assumption in mind, a closer look at the pertinent case-law will allow us to 
understand the threshold for triggering the public policy exception in order to apply it to 
interest rate swap contracts. A previous remark has to be made regarding the legal basis of the 
majority of the case law since at the time of the decisions, one of the two predecessors of the 
Brussels I Regulation, namely the 1968 Brussels Convention and the Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001, was in force. Since the wording was kept the same over the instruments with only 
slight changes, the case-law is perfectly applicable and can be relied upon. The 1968 Brussels 
convention only required a decision to be “contrary to public policy”
48
 to prevent its 
recognition in the Member State where it was sought. However, the Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 went further and established the requirement of the decision to be “manifestly 
contrary to public policy”
49
, reinforcing the principle of the free movement of judges. The 
Brussels I Regulation kept this wording in its article 45.  
The public policy exception was addressed for the first time by the European Court of Justice 
in the case Hoffmann v. Krieg
50
 where the court was asked to decide on whether a German 
decision establishing the obligation to make maintenance payments to a spouse could be 
recognized in the Netherlands. In the decision, the court emphasized the subsidiary nature of 
the public policy exception, stating that “the public-policy clause, which 'ought to operate 
only in exceptional cases […]”
51
. However, the decision of the court was not grounded on the 
public policy exception since there were other grounds for non-recognition that were 
applicable to the situation.  
Thus, it was only in Krombach v. Bamberski
52
, twelve years later, that the European Court of 
Justice had the opportunity to apply the public policy exception. A careful weighing of, on 
one hand, the Brussels I Convention and the free movement of judgements and, on the other, 
the fundamental rules and principles of a certain legal order had to take place. In order to 
establish the threshold for triggering the public policy exception the court had to define what 
principles and values to attend. Anticipating a topic that will be addressed further ahead in 
                                                          
48 Article 27/1 of Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters [The 1968 
Brussels Convention]. 
49 Article 34/1 of the Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. 
50 Case C-145/86 Hoffmann v. Krieg [1988] ECR 645. 
51 Idem, paragraph 21. 
52 Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski [2000]. 
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this chapter, this raises the question of what should be the content of the public policy 
exception. Should it be filled with national principles and values or should it go one step 
further and evolve to a European notion? Should the exception be based on domestic public 
policy or on international public policy? 
The answers to these questions started to come up in the Krombach v. Bamberski decision. 
The case concerned a German doctor, Mr. Krombach, who was accused of killing a French 
girl in Germany. The French court considered itself competent due to the nationality of the 
victim and ordered Mr. Krombach to appear before the court. The doctor did not attend the 
judgement since he was afraid to be arrested and the decision was rendered without him being 
heard. Krombach was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. Together with the criminal 
proceedings, the French civil court also ordered the payment of compensation to the parents 
of the victim. When the family sought the recognition of that order in Germany, Krombach 
appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal Court in Germany) reasoning that he had not 
had the chance to defend himself in the trial in France. 
Called to decide on whether demanding the presence in person of the defendant in order for 
his defence to be presented could be considered a violation of the fundamental principles of 
German legal system that would trigger the application of article 27 of the Brussels 
Convention, the court stated that “[…] the infringement would have to constitute a manifest 
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal 
order”
53
. By highlighting the importance of the right to a defence as a cornerstone of a fair 
trial, the court established the first threshold for triggering the public policy exception that 
indeed corresponds to a fundamental right predicted in article 6 (Right to a fair trial) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
Furthermore, the court also concluded that it is the court of the state where the recognition is 
sought that has the competence to define the content of the public policy exception as well as 
its limits. However, it is for the European Court of Justice to review the limits based on which 
the court refused the recognition of a judgment.
54
  
                                                          
53 Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] paragraph 37. 
54 Idem, paragraph 22. 
28 
 
The court also addressed this question in Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar 
and Formento
55
, where Mr. Fomento and Maxicar were held liable in France for unlawfully 
manufacturing and marketing parts for Renault vehicles. The question arose when Renault 
tried to enforce the decision in Italy where the industrial property rights in spare parts does 
not exist. Thus, the Italian court felt the need to refer to the European Court of Justice the 
question whether the decision of the French Court violated the free movement of goods and 
the freedom of competition established under EU law. Firstly, the judges stressed the 
conclusions reached by the previous case law, namely that the public policy exception should 
be interpreted strictly and that it should only be applicable in exceptional cases
56
. Secondly, 
they applied these principles to the situation at hand, stating that “The court of the State in 
which enforcement is sought cannot, without undermining the aim of the Convention, refuse 
recognition of a decision emanating from another Contracting State solely on the ground that 
it considers that national or Community law was misapplied in that decision.”
57
 
There are other cases that could be dealt with in this chapter
58
. However, the aforementioned 
case law gives us a clear picture of the content and application of the public policy exception. 
Summing up, it became clear that the public policy exception can only be invoked in 
exceptional cases when there is a manifest breach of a fundamental rule of law of a certain 
legal order.  
Taking these considerations in mind, we are now in a position to understand that the public 
policy exception cannot be triggered when some specificities or particularities of a legal 
system are at stake. That would absolutely frustrate the purpose of the Brussels I Regulation. 
Thus, it cannot have a direct correspondence with the domestic legal order. In order to assess 
the content of this exception, it is required to go one step further and place it at the European 
level. Hence, only a violation of a fundamental principle shared by all the member states 
could be considered the threshold for triggering the public-policy exception
59
 as was the case 
in Krombach v. Bamberski decision. These common values are described in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, legal instruments that comprise the “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
                                                          
55 Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000].  
56 Idem, paragraph 26. 
57 Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] paragraph 33. 
58 Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams [2009] or Canada Trust Company v. Stolzenberg and Gambazzi and others [2000]. 
59 This was precisely the position of the ECJ in Krombach v. Bamberski. 
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freedom and the rule of law”
60
 of all Member States. Indeed, the European Union is a legal 
community based around the same fundamental values. Therefore, it is likely that the content 
of public policy is similar in the Member States and the exception is rarely used.
61
  
Nevertheless, there are situations where the question may arise and the validity of interest rate 
swap contracts according to the Portuguese law is one of them. Despite the fact that this thesis 
is focused on the Banco Santander Totta decision and therefore in interest rate swap contracts, 
the conclusions reached are applicable to all financial derivative contracts.  
 
c. The public policy exception and the Banco Santander Totta decision 
In the Banco Santander Totta case, the defendants claimed that the interest rate swap contracts 
violated mandatory provisions of Portuguese law, which would lead to the application of 
article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention. In chapter IV, we came to the conclusion that there 
were international elements that place these contracts outside the scope of article 3 (3). Hence, 
it would not be necessary to address the question on whether mandatory provisions of 
Portuguese law were violated by the contracts. However, the High Court of Justice in the 
Banco Santander Totta decision felt the need to express its views on the topic.  
It is not my intention in this chapter to explore the topic of mandatory provisions of the 
Portuguese legal order that cannot be derogated by agreement in light of article 3 (3) of the 
Rome I Regulation, as the decision does so. Conversely, I intend to use the court’s 
conclusions to address the issue of the public policy exception under Article 45 of the 
Brussels Regulation. This question never arose in this case since Banco Santander Totta and 
the Portuguese Government came to an agreement regarding these contracts. Thus, the 
decision will not be recognized and enforced in Portugal
62
. However, if this deal had not been 
struck, the discussion concerning the obstacles to the recognition and enforcement of the 
decision of the High Court of Justice in Portugal would come up. Who knows whether this 
was not considered when taking the decision to settle for a deal.    
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The question on whether interest rate swap contracts violate the prohibition of games of 
chance and/or constitute an abnormal change of circumstances is much debated and very 
controversial in Portugal. The purpose of this thesis is to build a legal framework of the 
several obstacles these contracts may face, which requires, in this chapter, two levels of 
analysis. Firstly, an answer to the question on whether Portuguese law is being violated by 
these contracts has to be provided. Secondly, even if we came to the conclusion that interest 
rate swap contracts indeed violate the prohibition of games of chance and/or constitute an 
abnormal change of circumstances, these provisions have to integrate the concept of public 
policy in order for article 45 of the Brussels Regulation to be triggered.  
i.  The abnormal change of circumstances 
According to article 437 of the Portuguese Civil Code: 
1- If the circumstances on which the parties based their decision to enter into a contract have 
undergone an abnormal change, the injured party is entitled to termination of the contract or 
to modify it in accordance with principles of equity if fulfillment of that party’s obligations 
under the contract would be a serious breach of the principles of good faith and if the 
abnormal changes do not form part of the risks covered by the contract. 
Derivatives, namely interest rate swaps, became a popular financial instrument before the 
financial crisis of 2007 - 2008. For instance, in the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2007, 
28.000 interest rate swaps were sold to small businesses
63
. In June 2013, the gross value of 
the interest rate swaps market was estimate to be of US$13.6 billion according to the Bank for 
International Settlements.
64
 However, due to the financial crisis, interest rates dropped 
unexpectedly to near zero, which “turned the interest rate swaps into consistent losers for the 
parties who had the fixed rate, as each term ended with the LIBOR or the index rate below the 
fixed rates. The inverted effect of this was a windfall for the institutions holding the floating 
rate.”
65
 This scenario led the parties who had the fixed rate under the contracts (the 
                                                          
63 Matt Scuffham & Myles Neligan, Special Report: UK Banks Face Scandal Over Toxic Insurance Products, REUTERS, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/22/us-banks-insurance-idUSBRE87L09E20120822, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U4AX-UZYG. 
64 Paulo Mota Pinto, Contrato de swap de taxas de juro, jogo e aposta e alteração das circunstâncias que fundaram a 
decisão de contratar (Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, ano 143, n.º 3987, July/August 2014), p. 391.  
65 Zachary Ahonen, The Recent Financial Crisis and its Impact on Interest Rate Swaps: A Road to Recovery Through The 




counterparties to the banks) to seek the invalidity of these agreements before the courts 
grounded, among other arguments, on the abnormal change of circumstances. 
The debate taking place in the Portuguese courts is based on two questions: i) is the 
unpredictable change to interest rates and its maintenance at such low rates since the second 
quarter of 2009 an abnormal change of circumstances? and ii) is that change a risk covered by 
the contract? Since this is not the core topic of this thesis, an overall view of the case law will 
be provided but the topic cannot be addressed in any depth.
66
  
In providing answers to these questions, the courts do not have a harmonized opinion. 
However, a clear trend that considers the change to interest rates an abnormal change of 
circumstances that is not covered by the risks of the contract can be observed
67
. These 
decisions state that the abrupt and pronounced fall of the interest rates as a consequence of the 
financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 was an exceptional and unpredictable situation that had a direct 
impact on the interest rate swap contracts that suddenly became unbalanced. In a three-month 
period, the party who had the fixed rate suffered a considerable lost that was not covered by 
the risks of the contract. Consequently, maintaining the contracts would be contrary to general 
‘bona fide’ principles, as the parties would not usually have foreseen such a high risk of 
financial loss at the moment they entered into the agreements.
68
 
The case law that supports the argument that the fall in interest rates does not constitute an 




As was mentioned before, the High Court of Justice in the Banco Santander decision had the 
opportunity to reflect on this topic, coming to the conclusion that “there has been a profound 
change in the macro-economic circumstances on which the parties based their decision to 
enter the swaps. Applying the test in Art. 437 of the Civil Code, the court accepts their 
submission that the global financial crisis constitutes an «abnormal change of 
                                                          
66 To see literature’s opinions on this topic, read Paulo Mota Pinto, Contrato de swap de taxas de juro, jogo e aposta e 
alteração das circunstâncias que fundaram a decisão de contratar and Lebre de Freitas, Contrato de Swap Meramente 
Especulativo, Regimes de Validade e de Alteração de Circunstâncias (R.O.A., Ano 72, Vol. IV October/December, 2012, 
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67 Cf. Ac. STJ 10.10.2013, Process nº 1387/115 TBBCL.G1.S1 (Granja da Fonseca); Ac. TRL 8.5.2014, Process nº 531/11.7 
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 When addressing the question of whether the risk was covered by the 




ii. Prohibition of games of chance  
 
Article 1245 of the Portuguese Civil Code provides that  
Games and betting are not valid contracts and do not give rise to civil obligations; however, 
when lawful, games of chance give rise to natural obligations, except where by other motives 
they shall be deemed void or voidable pursuant to the general law, or, if the creditor has 
committed fraud in its execution. 
In light of this provision, a lot has been written about the possibility of interest rate swap 
contracts violating the prohibition of games of chance. Despite the dissenting opinions
72
, there 
is a clear majority, both in the literature and in the courts, that supports the opinion that 
interest rate swap contracts are not a game of chance. Summing up their arguments, it is 
firstly observed that an interest rate swap contracts is not exclusively dependent on luck or a 
fortuitous event, but rather on a projection based on studies regarding the evolution of a 
certain interest rate
73
. Moreover, it is also underlined that if a party to an interest rate swap 
contract enters into this agreement to hedge its exposure to the variation of a certain interest 
rate, it is because the risk already exists. Thus, the swap contract does not create a risk but 
rather aims to reduce or mitigate a risk that already exists.
74
 Furthermore, it was the parties’ 
intention to enter into a financial instrument, traded in capital markets and whose clauses 
were previously defined (most of the times under the ISDA Master Agreement), which clearly 
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71 Idem, paragraph 634. 
72 Lebre de Freitas, Contrato de Swap Meramente Especulativo, Regimes de Validade e de Alteração de Circunstâncias 
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74 Ac. STJ de 11-02-2015, Process n.º 309/11.8TVLSB.L1.S1 (Sebastião Póvoas). 
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sets this apart from the gambling regime.
75
 Additionally, while the speculation in the swap 
contracts is anchored on an economic purpose, games of chance are usually driven by 
irrational motivations, lacking an economic rationale
76
.  
Two other arguments objecting to the application of the gambling regime are presented in a 
court’s decision.
77
 On the one hand, it is stated that the swap contracts are regulated by the 
Portuguese Securities Code (article 2), which per se makes it impossible to apply article 1245 
of the Civil Code
78
. On the other, the speculation, usually rejected by the Portuguese legal 
system (this is the rationale behind article 1245), is justified in financial markets due to its 
commercially legitimate purposes, while the speculation in gambling activities does not have 
any purpose.   
Lastly, the authors highlight that the context, structure and aim of swap contracts and games 
of chance should not be confused. The latter is associated with entertainment and leisure.
79
 
Furthermore, in the gambling activity, both the parties have the intention to bet
80
, whereas in 
swap contracts it is difficult to imagine that a financial institution that operates professionally 
in the derivatives market shares that intention
81
.  
The High Court of Justice in the Banco Santander decision expressed its opinion on this topic 




d. Are there grounds to challenge the recognition and enforcement of the 
Banco Santander Totta decision in Portugal? 
Thus far, we have come to two conclusions: i) the recognition and enforcement of a decision 
may be challenged based on the public policy exception as long as fundamental values shared 
by all the Member-States are being violated; ii) despite the lack of unanimity on this topic, it 
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82 The Banco Santander Totta decision, paragraph 453 (1). 
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is firmly arguable that the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 and the consequent drop in interest 
rates is sufficient grounds for seeking the invalidity of the interest rate swap contracts under 
the abnormal change of circumstances provision. The same cannot be said regarding the 
prohibition of games of chance since the argument is much less stronger.  
Therefore, one last answer has to be provided in order to close our reasoning – is the 
abnormal change of circumstances part of public policy, what would trigger the exception 
provided in article 45 a) of the Brussels I Regulation?  
A similar question was addressed by the High Court of Justice in the Banco Santander 
decision and the conclusions reached are of use for this thesis. Hence, the experts and the 
judge shared their opinions on whether article 437 is a mandatory provision of Portuguese 
law. Only if the answer is positive can we take another step and state that indeed it is part of 
public policy.  
Once again, the authors have not reached a common understanding on this topic. Thus, 
Manuel Carneiro da Frada supports the mandatory nature of article 437 grounded, among 
other arguments, on “the underlying rationale of the provision (as preventing substantively 
unfair situations, which would otherwise be contrary to good faith)”
83
 Furthermore, Pedro 
Pais de Vasconcelos states that, even though we can only resort to article 437 when there is 
not a contractual solution, “article 437 does not cease to be mandatory”
84
.  
Nevertheless, equally reputable professors have the opposing view. Paulo Câmara proposes 
several arguments
85
 that justify the non-mandatory nature of the provision. Moreover, Mário 
Júlio de Almeida Costa reaches the same conclusion by arguing that the parties have the 




This brief over-view of the literature’s position regarding the nature of article 437 allows us to 
proceed on our reasoning. If it is arguable that the abnormal change of circumstances is a 
mandatory provision of the Portuguese legal system, there is room to ask whether that 
institute can trigger the public policy exception.  
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84 Idem, paragraph 489 (1). 
85 Idem, paragraph 498. 
86 Mário Júlio de Almeida, Direito das Obrigações (Almedina, 2009) p. 341. 
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It is my belief that if authors had been faced with this question, they would answer it in 
different ways due to the contrasting opinions we have been exposing throughout this thesis. 
In order to come to the conclusion that a decision of a foreign court concerning interest rate 
swap contracts would not be recognized in Portugal by virtue of the public policy exception, 
multiple “yesses” would have to be provided. Yes, interest rate swap contracts entered into 
before the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 would be subject to the abnormal change of 
circumstances; yes, article 437 is a mandatory provision of our legal order and, finally, yes, 
this provision is part of the fundamental values of our legal system.  
My understanding is that the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 must be considered an abnormal 
change to the circumstances under which the parties have concluded the agreements. The drop 
in interest rates was unpredictable and created an extremely unbalanced situation whose risk 
was not covered by the contracts. Moreover, I also share Professor Carneiro da Frada’s view 
on the nature of article 437, supporting that it is a mandatory provision of the portuguese legal 
system since the waiver or limitation of the application of this provision can only take place 
concerning known risks but it does not apply to unknown risks. Hence, the application of 
article 437 cannot be fully excluded
87
. Nevertheless, I find it hard to argue that fundamental 
values of the Portuguese legal order are at stake.  
The public policy exception established in Brussels Regulation I can only be balanced with 
the free movement of decisions, a fundamental principle of European Union law, if a narrow 
interpretation of the public policy concept is adopted. In light of this reasoning, and despite 
knowing that article 437 safeguards the ”bona fide” principles, a cornerstone of the 
Portuguese legal system, I believe there is no grounds to trigger the public policy exception. 
The is a principle spread throughout several provisions of the Portuguese legal system but 
despite its importance, it would be indefensible to support that all of them constitute a 
sufficient ground to seek the non-recognition of a decision. Therefore, we need to go further 
in what concerns the level of importance of the value that is safeguarded by the provision in 
order to support that it integrates the notion of public policy. That step can only be taken in 
light of the European instruments protecting human rights. Hence, in order to come to the 
conclusion that the public policy exception would be triggered in this situation, fundamental 
values protected by the European Convention on Human Rights and by the Charter of 
                                                          




Fundamental Rights of the European Union would have to be violated by the interest rate 
swap contracts and I do not believe that is the case.  
In summary, as long as a European and constitutional notion of public policy is adopted, as it 
is my view, the Banco Santander Totta decision would not face any obstacle when recognized 
in Portugal.  
 
VI. Conclusions  
It was my goal in this thesis to address two legal obstacles a dispute before a foreign court on 
interest rate swap contracts could face.  
The first obstacle is originated in article 3 of the Rome I Regulation. In order to be able to 
fully comprehend it, previous knowledge on the derivatives market had to be acquired. Hence, 
the content of ISDA Master Agreement was explored since the majority of the transactions 
nowadays are made with this documentation. Special emphasis was given to the Governing 
Law and Jurisdiction clause since it was due to the choice made in this clause that the first 
obstacle came up.  
When studying the ISDA Master Agreement, we came across the fact that the parties have the 
possibility to choose between English law and the law of the State of New York. That practice 
is called “forum shopping” and is grounded on the principle of freedom of choice. 
Nevertheless, it has its limits and the first obstacle detailed on this thesis is one of them. I 
refer to article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention.  
Indeed parties are free to choose the law governing their contracts and that is the common 
practice in swap contracts, including in single country agreements, where often the choice 
determines English law as the competent law. Nevertheless, according to article 3 (3) of the 
Rome I Regulation, that choice cannot waive the mandatory provisions of the legal system 
that all the relevant elements to the agreement are connected with. On the one hand, in 
domestic contracts, with exception to the governing law clause, all elements point to the 
country where the parties are incorporated in and have their business. On the other, one could 
argue that there are elements that internationalize the agreements, putting it outside the scope 
of article 3 (3), such as, among others, the use of the ISDA Master Agreement.  
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In that regard, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales was called upon to decide on 
whether article 3 (3) of the Rome I Convention should be relied upon in domestic swap 
agreements and determine the application of the mandatory provisions of the domestic law 
that could not be derogated by contract. It provided two different answers.  
In Dexia, the court came to the conclusion that in order for an agreement to be placed outside 
the scope of article 3 (3), its relevant elements had to point to a concrete jurisdiction other 
than the domestic one, in that case Italy. Therefore, it was not enough that the elements 
connect the agreement with the “international sphere”; a concrete connection to a foreign 
jurisdiction was required.  
The court had a chance to reflect again on what seems to have been an excessively broad 
interpretation of the provision, incompatible with party autonomy and with the derivatives 
market itself and the legal certainty it entails. That opportunity came with the Banco 
Santander decision, an equal situation where interest rate swap agreements had been entered 
into by Portuguese parties that have designated English law as its governing law. Claims that 
these contracts violated provisions of Portuguese law led the court to decide on whether this 
was a purely domestic agreement or if its elements internationalize it. Despite being located in 
a common law system where the rule of precedent has major importance, the court overturned 
Dexia and provided an all-new interpretation of article 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation, where 
it was no longer required that the elements of the agreement connect it with a specific 
jurisdiction. The court assessed several elements, among which I highlight the possibility to 
assign the contractual positions, the use of the ISDA Master Agreement and the conclusion of 
back-to-back swaps with foreign entities, to come to the conclusion that they place the 
agreement outside the domestic legal order, rendering it out of scope of article 3 (3). Hence, 
the mandatory provisions of Portuguese law do not affect the choice of the governing law.  
The second obstacle addressed in this thesis comes up later in a timeline of a foreign decision 
concerning interest rate swaps agreements and it is related with its recognition and 
enforcement in Portugal. It is grounded on article 45 of the Brussels I Regulation that allows 
for the refusal of the recognition of a judgement based on the public policy exception. 
In order to assess how this provision could be an obstacle to foreign decisions on swap 
contracts, several steps had to be taken. Firstly, the concept of public policy was defined. A 
review of the relevant case law was provided, as well as a critical analysis, in order to reach 
the conclusion that this notion has to be filled with European and constitutional values. In 
38 
 
order for the free movement of decisions to be preserved, only a violation of a fundamental 
principle shared by all member states can be considered the threshold for triggering the 
public-policy exception.  
Secondly, the public policy exception could only be raised if there was a violation of the 
Portuguese law by these agreements. Thus, we discussed whether interest rate swap 
agreements could qualify for an abnormal change in circumstance in light of article 437 of the 
Portuguese Civil Code and/or violate the prohibition of games of chance stated in article 
1245. Despite the lack of unanimity among the literature and case law, it is defensible that the 
financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 represents an abnormal change of the circumstances under 
which these contracts were concluded.  
Furthermore, another step had to be taken in order to trigger the public policy exception in the 
recognition of the decision: the abnormal change of circumstances provision has to integrate 
public policy. At this point is where I believe this line of reasoning breaks. According to the 
concept of public policy supported by this thesis, fundamental values protected by European 
instruments would have to be violated by this decision to trigger the public policy exception 
and I believe this is not the case. The ”bona fide” principles safeguarded by this rule are 
important components of the Portuguese legal system, but if we fill the notion of public policy 
with the particularities of each domestic legal order, this exception would be too frequently 
raised and the free movement of decisions jeopardized.  
Taking everything into consideration, two material obstacles to disputes concerning interest 
rate swap contracts before foreign courts were presented. The interpretation provided by the 
Banco Santander Totta decision reduces the risk of the application of mandatory provisions of 
the law the agreement has the closest connection with. As for the second obstacle, namely the 
recognition and enforcement of a decision regarding interest rate swaps in Portugal, it is more 
difficult to predict since there are different views on the several assumptions required to come 
to the conclusion that the public policy exception can be raised. We will have to wait for a 
similar decision to be recognized and enforced in Portugal to gain more valuable insight on 
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